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1. Introduction
The European Monetary System (EMS) was initially planned as an agreement to
reduce exchange rate volatility for a Europe in transition to closer economic integration.
Following its inception in March 1979, a group of European countries linked their
exchange rates through formal participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
The essence of the ERM was that each participating country was assigned a specific
range (target zone) within it its exchange rate could fluctuate with respect to the others.
In order to keep the exchange rates within these margins, the participating countries
were obliged to intervene in the foreign exchange market whenever their currency
approached the limits of its band. Realignment of the parities by the monetary
authorities was possible, provided that all the members of the EMS agreed.
The fluctuation bands were originally set at –2.25%, but a –6% band was set for
Italy and the newcomers (Spain, the UK, and Portugal). After almost a year of turmoil
unprecedented in the history of the EMS, the fluctuation bands of the ERM were
broadened to –15% in August 1993 (except for the Dutch guilder and the Deutschmark,
which remained within the narrow bands of –2.25%). There have been fifty-eight
realignments during the 1979-1998 period, implemented in nineteen discrete
adjustments. It should be noted that thirty eight of such realignments were made prior to
the currency turmoil of 1992/93.
Researchers and practitioners alike were caught up with these institutional
arrangements, and a number of exchange rate target zone models have been introduced.
The ERM is the most prominent example of a target zone exchange-rate system.
Starting with the seminal study by Krugman (1991), a large number of papers have
examined the behaviour of exchange rates in target zones (see Kempa and Nelles, 1999,
for a review). The main result of the target zone model is that, with perfect credibility,
the zone exerts a stabilising effect (the so-called ''honeymoon'' effect), reducing the
sensitivity of exchange rates to a given change in fundamentals. Nevertheless, in a
target zone with credibility problems, expectations of future interventions tend to
destabilise the exchange rate, making it less stable than the underlying fundamentals
(Bertola and Caballero, 1992).
Credibility can be defined as the degree of confidence that economic agents assign
to the announcements made by policymakers. In a context of an exchange rate target
zone, like the EMS, credibility refers to the perception of economic agents with respect
to the commitment to maintain the exchange rate around a central parity. Therefore, the
possibility that the official authorities change the central parity could be anticipated by
the economic agents, triggering expectations of future changes in the exchange rate that
could act as a destabilising element of the system.
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on a set of alternative
credibility indicators to detect certain main periods in the ERM history. The data
employed have a weekly frequency and all ERM currencies are covered by the study.
Most of these indicators were developed during the early 1990s and have been applied
to various data sets for different currencies and data frequencies, but a comparative
analysis has not yet been conducted. This is the major innovation of the paper and to
that end we examine the ability of the credibility indicators in detecting exchange rate
crisis. In addition, we explore the utility of this approach to other contexts by studying1
the credibility of the Danish krone and the Greek dracma vis-à-vis the euro in the new,
modified exchange rate mechanism (the so-called ERM-II).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the credibility indicators
and the empirical results. In Section 3 we carry out a comparison among the credibility
indicators used in this study. In Section 4 we extend our analysis to the currencies in the
ERM-II. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Measuring credibility
 In this section we present the four credibility measures that we have used in this
paper. Some of them have been widely employed in empirical literature, while others,
like the marginal credibility indicator, have received much less attention.
2.1. Credibility indicators
2.1.1. Svensson’s simple test
Svensson (1991) presented a simple test to study the credibility of a target zone
exchange rate regime with fluctuation bands. There are two traditional versions of this
test. In the first one, it is assumed that there is no arbitrage, while in the second version
uncovered interest parity (UIP) is assumed to hold. In order to compare this indicator
with the one based on the drift-adjustment method (see subsection 2.1.2), a more recent
variant of the former is usually estimated.
To that end, we calculate a 100% confidence interval for the expected rate of
realignment of the exchange rate under study vis-à-vis the German mark, using the
three-month interbank rate. Taking into account the UIP hypothesis
1, the expected rate
of realignment is bounded according to:
[ ] (1)          /   ) ( / / ) (
* * t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x x i i c E x x i i - - - £ D £ - - - +
where xt is the deviation of the log exchange rate st from the log central parity ct,  t x  and
t x  are the lower and upper bounds of the exchange rate bands, t is the maturity (valued
at 3/12 for a 3-month maturity), i-i* is the interest rate differential, and E[·] is the
expectation operator.
This more recent version of  Svensson's simple test has been criticised because it
only takes into account the possibility of realignments in the limits of the band, thus
placing excessive weight on credibility. This is one of the reasons why the results
obtained with this test might not be completely accurate.
2.1.2. The drift-adjustment method
This method, originally proposed by Bertola and Svensson (1993), computes an
econometric estimate of the expectations of economic agents regarding the realignment
                                               
1  Svensson (1992) and Ayuso and Restoy (1992) have estimated risk premia that are insignificant for the
currencies in the ERM and, hence, the expected rate of depreciation is closely related to the interest rate
differential.2
in the ERM. These realignment expectations constitute an inverse measure of
credibility. The drift-adjustment method also assumes UIP to hold.
In this method, the expected rate of devaluation g
t
t is obtained from:
[ ] (2)                                                 / /
* t t
t nr x E i i g t t t t t + D - - =
This procedure implies estimating the expected rate of depreciation within the
band in absence of realignment (nr) [the last term on the right-hand side of equation





estimated, the corresponding 90 percent confidence intervals can be calculated. These
intervals can be directly compared with those of the more recent version of Svensson's
simple test.
In this paper we have estimated the expected rate of depreciation within the band
using a linear regression model where the exchange rate and the domestic and foreign
interest rates are taken as explanatory variables
2:
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where xt+t and xt are the exchange rate (log) deviation from the central parity in period
t+t and t, respectively, and where it and it
* are the national and German three-month
interest rates, respectively. The variables dj denote the dummies for the subperiods
between the realignments and the widening of the bands
3. Following a “general-to-
specific” modelling methodology [see, e. g., Hendry (1995)], equation (3) was
continuously simplified and re-parametrised until a parsimonious representation of the
data generation process was arrived at
4.
The drift-adjustment method has been criticized. In particular, it has been
pointed out that the selection of the explanatory variables is ad hoc, without an
appropriate theoretical framework. Furthermore, the non-stationarity of the exchange
rate may generate some problems when the expected rate of variation (Darvas,1998) is
estimated. These problems depend on its position within the band. Thus, it is important
to be careful when we are interpreting the results obtained from this method.
                                               
2 When considering the practical implementation of the drift-adjustment method, the empirical studies
that have computed this measure have used different econometric specifications for the expected rate of
depreciation within the band. Lindberg et al. (1993), Svensson (1993), and Rose and Svensson (1994)
have estimated a linear regression model where the exchange rate in t+t depends on its value at moment t
(and, in some cases, lagged exchange rates) and on the interest rate differential. On the other hand,
Bertola and Svensson (1993) consider xt as the only explanatory variable, assuming a mean-reverting
model for the exchange rate within the band, as in  Ayuso et al. (1994) and in Gómez and Montalvo
(1997).
3 We have also taken into account the widening of the bands, since this event produced a major change in
the ERM, as can be observed in a greater fluctuation of the exchange rates before August 1993.
4 Svensson (1993) eliminates from the sample the 65 observations corresponding to the three months
before a realignment took place, given that he, like us, uses t= 3 months. Given the important reduction in
the number of observations implied by this strategy, similarly to Gómez and Montalvo (1997) we use
equation (3) to estimate the whole sample. In this way, we are estimating the expected depreciation rate
within the band that includes possible jumps in each realignment. Therefore, we obtain the expected rate
of realignment, but not the expected devaluation rate gt
t (which, in addition, includes the expected jump in
the exchange rate within the band in the realignments).3
2.1.3. Models of discrete choice
This kind of model aims to estimate the probability of realignment by means of
econometric techniques. To that end, explanatory variables are used to compute that
probability, assuming normal or logistic distributions. Among the explanatory variables,
it is usual to include the interest rate differential, the inflation differential, the current
account balance, and the unemployment rate, leading to estimates using monthly or
quarterly data
5.
We have introduced the exchange rate, the interest rate differential, and two
target zone variables, i.e., the distance to the upper fluctuation band and to central
parity. The selection of these stems from our interest in the estimation of credibility
with high frequency data.
In this paper, we have estimated a logit model based on the following equation:
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where F(·) is the logistic distribution function (F(l) is the probability that a normally
distributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance does not exceed l), z1t
denotes an explanatory variable, and P(yt=0)=1-Pt. The parameters in equation (4) are
estimated by maximising the logarithm of the likelihood function with respect to
individual observations:
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The drift-adjustment method estimates the 90% confidence interval (section
2.1.2). If both limits of the interval were simultaneously greater than, or less than, zero,
the agents would have expected realignments with 90% confidence. Assuming that
when yt=0 there is no credibility and that when yt=1 there is credibility, we use the drift-
adjustment method to design the logit model. In other words, when yt=0 the limits of the
confidence interval for the expected rate of realignment are both simultaneously greater
than or less than zero. When yt=1 this does not occur
6. This strategy allows us to obtain
the probability that agents assign to the credibility of the exchange rate regime at each
moment of time.
We have used different approaches to estimate the probability that national
commitments towards the ERM were credible, defining z1t as the explanatory variable:
either the exchange rate, or the distance to the upper fluctuation band, or the distance to
the central parity, or the interest rate differential.
                                               
5 Edin and Vredin (1993) employ a two-step procedure suggested by Heckman (1976) to calculate both
the probability and the expected size of the devaluation. In the first step of the estimation procedure, the
probability of devaluation occurring at time t+1, based on information available at time t, is estimated. In
the second step, the unconditional expectation of the rate of devaluation in period t is obtained.
6 Note that this measure, when formulated in this manner, assigns credibility to any period when the lower
bound is negative and the upper bound is positive.4
2.1.4. Marginal credibility
This credibility measure proposed by Weber (1991a) focuses on the ability of
policy announcements to influence the public’s expectations. It measures the impact of
official announcements on exchange rates and may be thought of as the weight placed
on the announcement when the public forms their expectations. This credibility measure
is equal to one if the policy-maker always makes fully credible announcements, and
tends to zero as the announcements become non-credible. Marginal credibility (at) is
defined as:
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where the expectation operator is conditional on the information available in t-1, and ut
is a random disturbance.
A model of the public's expectation forming process is required in order to
estimate at. We generate the expected exchange rate using the best ARIMA model for
each exchange rate
7. By applying the Kalman filter, at can be estimated, and so we
obtain a different value of at for each moment in the sample period, thereby allowing
the study of credibility through the evolution of at over time.
As is well known, the Kalman filter is an updating estimation method which
bases the regression estimates for each time period on the previous period’s estimates
plus the data for the current time period (i.e., it bases estimates on data up to and
including the current period).
The model estimated is the following:
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where yt is a vector of differences st-Et-1(st), 
'
t w  is a row vector comprising ones and
differences ct - Et-1(st). Equation (8) is called the transition equation (which describes the
evolution of a set of state variables), whereas equation (7) is the measurement equation
(which describes how the data actually observed is generated from the state variables).
bt is the state vector that follows a random walk and T is a 2x2 identity matrix. The
initial conditions are established by b0~N(b0, P0), where P0 is a variance-covariance
matrix for the initial conditions. Finally, ht is the variance of the errors in the
measurement equation and Qt is the variance-covariance matrix for the errors in the
transition equation.
The Kalman filter is a recursive method that computes the optimal estimate of
the state variables in period t, based precisely on the information available in t.  For
each period, we use a conditional maximum likelihood for the information set-up for
that period. The logarithm of the likelihood function is defined as follows:
                                               
7 We employ an ARIMA model for its simplicity. On the one hand, the large variety of non-linear models
makes it rather difficult to choose the best one and, on the other, previous experience indicates that
although a non-linear model could improve on our predictions, the advantages are very limited [see, e. g.,
Clements and Smith (1999) or García and Gençay (2000)].5
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The use of an econometric technique that allows for changes in the values of the
parameters over time may be appropriate for the study of credibility in a target zone.
These changes in parameters could be explained by stabilising interventions by the
central banks, speculative movements by private agents and realignments. In fact, this
possibility was pointed out by Weber (1991a, 1991b) before the monetary turmoil of
September 1992, and more recently by Darvas (1998).
2.2. Empirical results
The credibility indicators introduced in the previous subsection have been
applied to weekly exchange and interest rate data from eight ERM countries (Belgium,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Data restrictions
led us to use weekly data (the highest frequency available). Nevertheless, the use of
weekly rates facilitates comparisons with previous studies and avoids problems with the
day-of-the week effects in the data. Wednesday spot rates and three-month interbank
rates were obtained from the Bank of Spain and the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
(BBVA). Given the central role of Germany in the European Union (see, e. g.,
Bajo-Rubio et al., 2001), our exchange rates are expressed vis-à-vis the Deutschmark.
The sample period runs from 13 March 1979 to 30 December 1998 (1034 observations),
covering the complete EMS history. Figures 1a to 1h show the evolution of the
exchange rates under study
8.
[Figures 1a to 1h, here]
The estimates for the indicators are presented in Tables 1 to 4 for each one of the
currencies analysed. Regarding the drift-adjustment method, the results of the
estimation for the expected rate of depreciation within the band obtained by ordinary
least squares (OLS) are shown in Table 1, where the standard errors have been corrected
for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (which results from the “overlapping
observations” problem) using a Newey-West covariance estimator. As can be seen, the
estimated coefficients for x, i and i* are clearly significant. The coefficients for xt are
negative, indicating mean-reversion of the exchange rate within the band. The
associated t-ratio for these coefficients safely rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root,
as in Svensson (1993). With the sole exception of the Dutch guilder, the estimated signs
of i and i* are in accordance with those reported by Svensson (1993) and by Rose and
Svensson (1994). Finally, the dummy variables are significant, except those related to
the Portuguese escudo, the French franc and the Belgium franc, suggesting the
relevance of the different regimes in the history of the ERM.
[Table 1, here]
                                               
8 The fluctuation bands were built following Honohan (1979). We took into account the lack of symmetry
between the two intervention limits due to the requirement that the upper intervention limit for currency
X with respect to currency Y equals the lower intervention limit for currency Y with respect to currency
X.6
The estimates of the probability of devaluation indicator based on the exchange
rate, on the distance to the upper fluctuation band, on the distance to the central parity,
and on the interest rate differential, are presented in Table 2. This table shows the
results for each one of these four options, while in Table 3 we present the associated
summary statistics of their estimated probabilities.
[Tables 2 to 3, here]
As can be seen in these tables, the estimated coefficients are all statistically
significant, and the estimated (credibility) probabilities have a mean greater than 0.9,
suggesting a subjective probability of realignment of 0.1. Time series of the probability
of credibility have been calculated using the estimation results of Table 2. We only plot
the results obtained using the interest rate differential with respect to Germany as the
explanatory variable
9.
Lastly, the estimation of marginal credibility (at) is based on equation (6), where
the random disturbance ut is normal with a zero mean and a constant variance. Table 4
reports the estimation results. The upper panels in that table report OLS estimates of at
as benchmarks for comparisons.
[Table 4, here]
Next we will discuss, country-by-country, the evidence provided by the various
indicators for a given country’s exchange rate, and we will compare the identification of
crisis periods which the indicators provide with differing degrees of accuracy.
Belgium
The Belgian franc suffered three periods where a temporary crisis of credibility
is detected: around its realignments in February 1982 and in April 1986, and after the
widening of the ERM fluctuation bands in August 1993. These periods are detected for
all indicators (except the Svensson’s simple test –Figure2a- that in most of the sample
cannot reject the hypothesis that the expected rate of realignment is zero).
The smooth improvement in credibility over time after 1986 is better captured
by marginal credibility (Figure 5a), which also indicates more clearly the periods
leading to the realignments in 1982 and 1983. For its part, the drift-adjustment method
(Figure 3a) and the probability of devaluation (Figure 4a) detect the more general crisis
that occurred in February 1990 (around the crisis in asset markets, and before the entry
of the Italian lira in the narrow bands).
Denmark
Although its initial phase in the ERM was more unstable, the dynamics of the
Danish krone were similar to those described for the Belgian franc. Thus the
realignment in January 1987 placed the Danish krone near to parity (with respect to the
                                               
9  Plots of the results obtained using the exchange rate, the distance to the upper fluctuation band, and the
distance to the central parity as the explanatory variable are available from the corresponding author upon
request.7
German mark) at the end of the ERM. Moreover, the widening of the fluctuation band
reduced the volatility of the exchange rate only after 1995.
The most critical periods detected by the indicators occurred around the dates of
entry of Portugal and Spain in the European Community in October-November 1985,
around the devaluations of 1986 and 1987, during the continuous market pressures
against the Danish krone registered in December 1992, and when the band was
broadened.
The Svensson’s simple test in Figure 2b is less informative, and the probability
of devaluation only indicates a fall in credibility before the widening of the ERM
fluctuation band (see figure 4b). The drift-adjustment method, presented in Figure 3b,
shows the pressures faced by the Danish krone during the first quarter of 1995 more
clearly. In Figure 5b, marginal credibility clearly detects the continuous gains in
credibility achieved by the devaluations in the eighties.
France
The general evolution mentioned above also characterises the French franc.
What is more, in most of the sample period the Belgian franc, the Danish Krone and the
Irish pound chose the soft currency option supplied by the Banque de France (Weber,
1991).
The main crises in credibility can be observed around the broadening of the band
in August 1993 and around the devaluations of June 1982, March 1983, April 1986, and
January 1987. Moreover, the French franc also suffered several attacks during the first
quarter of 1995 that the drift-adjustment method registered as a greater increase in the
expected rate of devaluation than the period around the widening of the band (see
Figure 3c). The probability of devaluation presented in Figure 4c, shows the turmoils in
the financial markets in January 1988 as a major crisis. Lastly, in Figure 5c, the
marginal credibility displays a smoother and continous increase after a more unstable
beginning (due to the crises in 1982 and 1983, before the austerity programme that was
adopted after de devaluation in March 1983).
Ireland
The dynamics of this exchange rate is similar to the one associated with the
currencies mentioned above. In this case, in spite of the broadening of the band the Irish
pound presents more irregular behaviour. After the widening of the band we observe a
depreciation until March 1996 followed by an appreciation period until March 1998,
when the central rate of the Irish pound was revalued upwards by 3 per cent to a level
consistent with sustained convergence.
The agents’ confidence was reduced in the periods around the realignments of
March 1983, August 1986, January 1987, and February 1993. Moreover, the end of
1992 (detected even by the simple test presented in Figure 2d) and the broadening of the
fluctuation band are detected as major crisis periods.
As can be observed in Figure 5d, marginal credibility clearly recognizes the
importance of the realignment in March 1983, the speculative attacks at the end of 19928
that led to the devaluation in February 1993, and the widening of the band in August
1993. This indicator also detects the stabilizing effect of the revaluation in March 1998.
In Figure 3d, the drift-adjustment method clearly displays the crises around the
devaluations that occurred in 1986 and 1987. On the contrary, the devaluation
probability does not indicate any change in credibility around the critical periods in
1983 and before the realignment in March 1998 (see Figure 4d).
The Netherlands
From 1984 the Dutch guilder/German mark exchange rate moved quite close to
its central parity, indicating a high degree of confidence by agents with respect to its
evolution inside the band. Indeed the Netherlands chose the hard currency option,
pegging its exchange rate to the German mark. This fact permitted it to gain credibility
at the beginning of the ERM, and to maintain credibility for the rest of its history in the
system.
The probability of devaluation indicator does not detect any reduction in
credibility while the marginal credibility and the drift-adjustment method only register
instability until mid-1982.
Spain
The Spanish peseta seemed to be the currency suffering the most speculative
attacks after its entrance in the ERM in 1989. Contrary to the currencies analysed above,
the Spanish peseta/German mark exchange rate was maintained between central parity
and its upper limit of appreciation during the first three years in the ERM. In spite of
this, the attacks forced two devaluations during the last quarter of 1992, the most
dangerous crisis period of the ERM. The widening of the band on 1993 and the
devaluation in May 1995 had a stabilizing effect that lasted until the introduction of the
euro.
All the indicators reflect lack of credibility around the devaluations of
September and November 1992, before the widening of the band, and prior to the
realignment in March 1995. In Figure 5h, marginal credibility points out that the
realignment in 1995 had its origin in financial market turmoil  from June 1994. In
addition, the drift-adjustment method estimates expected rates of appreciation between
the devaluation in May 1993 and the broadening of the band in August 1993 (see Figure
3h). The probability of devaluation indicator, presented in Figure 4h, shows that after
the instability which led to the realignment of March 1995 credibility only improved in
March 1996, coinciding with the general elections.
Portugal
As can be observed in Figure 1c, the Portuguese escudo/German mark exchange
rate fluctuated around central parity, and the devaluations occurred quite far from the
upper band. This seems to indicate that this currency was not devaluated for domestic
reasons but rather due to more intense attacks on other currencies of the ERM and the
crises in international financial markets [see Ledesma et al. (1999b)]..9
In spite of this, the credibility indicators detect transitory falls in credibility
between September and November of 1992, and in mid-1993. In Figure 4g, the
indicator based on the devaluation probability registers a confidence crisis in June 1994
around the time of the crack in international financial markets. The drift-adjustment
method, in Figure 3g, provides an increase in the expected rate of devaluation during a
small period at the beginning of 1995, and a sudden switch from a positive to a negative
expected rate of devaluation between the realignment of May 1993 and the broadening
of the fluctuation band in August. The marginal credibility, presented in Figure 5g,
shows the relevance of the realignment of  November 1992 in order to improve
credibility.
Italy
The Italian lira/German mark exchange rate had a clear depreciation trend over
time, except at the end of the period in which this currency did not belong to the ERM
in 1995. During the eighties the lira was devaluated five times and the speculative
attacks of September 1992 caused the suspension of its participation in the ERM. After
re-joining ERM this currency moved closer to central parity.
The first period in the ERM was characterized by a low level of credibility until
the devaluation of March 1983. The results also suggest that when the Italian lira re-
joined ERM it experienced higher credibility levels than before it left. As can be seen in
Figure 4f, the probability of devaluation indicator is less informative with a constant
evolution along time. The marginal credibility provides some evidence of credibility
gains for the Italian lira just before leaving the ERM as in Fernández-Rodríguez et al.
(2003) .
3. Comparison among indicators
The primary purpose of this section is to explore the differences among the
indicators studied in the previous section. To that end, and given that there does not
exist an observed credibility time series to assess the ability of each indicator to mimic
such a series, we consider two alternative approaches. Firstly, we assume that market
participants observe the indicators and evaluate them in the light of their mean and
variance, as these summary statistics constitute a good approximation to the level and
the volatility in each indicator. Secondly, we consider that economic agents use some
procedure to extract signals of such indicators in order to continually re-evaluate the
exchange rate commitments. In both cases we try to assess the ability of each indicator
to identify the main periods of  speculative attacks and realignments in the ERM.
3.1. Analysing the mean and the variance
Here we present a simple graphical method in order to obtain a first
approximation of the degree of efficiency associated with each credibility indicator. We
have studied the changes of the first and second order moments prior to the main events
of the sample period. In particular, for each indicator and for each exchange rate, we use
information on location (mean) and spread (volatility) to assess its behaviour in the10
month prior to the main events: the realignments and the broadening of the bands
(August 1993)
10.
Once we calculated the mean and the standard deviation for the whole period, as
well as for the different subperiods before events, we measured the percentage changes
between the values for each one of these subperiods and the corresponding values for
the complete period. Then, we placed the six
11 indicators from the greatest to the
smallest degree of detection of the selected events (i.e., from the greatest to the smallest
percentage difference between the subperiods and the whole period). In this way, we
assigned scores from 1 to 6 according to the place occupied by each measure in each
event detected. For each exchange rate and each event, we have six scores, one for each
indicator, corresponding to the changes in mean and six from the changes in standard
deviation.
In Figure 6 for each one of the six indicators under study, we have considered
the mean and the standard deviation separately. We have added the mean scores and the
standard deviation scores across events and exchange rates. Therefore, the closer is the
position of an indicator to the origin, the better is its ability to predict the events during
the month before. As can be seen, the closest position  to the origin (96, 147)
corresponds to marginal credibility. This indicator seems to be the most accurate in
predicting the events selected (i.e., the realignments of each exchange rate and the
broadening of the bands). Marginal credibility presents a better balance between
changes in mean and changes in standard deviation in the detection of events.
The crisis probability indicator, based on the exchange rate, for both mean and
standard deviation has a worse position (96, 160) than marginal credibility due to a
lower degree of detection in terms of the mean. The relative merits of the exchange rate
could be explained if the level and the changes of this variable were closely followed by
agents in the foreign exchange markets. The drift-adjustment method (238, 44) seems to
be the best indicator with respect to the changes in the mean, but it is the worst one with
respect to volatility. It is surprising that the indicators based on the existence of a target
zone do not provide the best predictions. The credibility indicators based on the
distances to the upper band and to central parity might have lost their relevance due to
the great length of the period following the widening of the bands until December 1998.
The great width of the fluctuation bands may have diminished the ability of these
variables to capture the main events
12.
[Figure 6, here]
                                               
10 The choice of a subperiod prior to each one of the selected events tries to capture the predictive quality
of the different measures. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that we are not taking into account the
number of events registered by each indicator; this last element could have been an alternative criteria in
order to carry out the comparison.
11 Svensson’s simple test was eliminated due to its sensitivity to the size of the fluctuation band.
12 We have also used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compare the credibility indicators by
simultaneously examining the variation in mean and in standard deviation in all the realignments in the
history of the ERM and in the broadening of the bands (August 1993). The results, not shown here but
available from the authors upon request, support those obtained from the simple graphic comparison.11
3.2. Extracting signals
In our second approach, we consider that market participants make use of some
procedure to extract signals of the credibility indicators, allowing them to dynamically
revise their perception with respect to the commitment to maintain the exchange rate
around a central parity. In this sense, and given the relevance of technical analysis in
foreign exchange markets
13, it might seem natural to assume that market participants
use moving averages (MA) to infer the likely course of future movements in the
credibility indicators from its behaviour in the past. Indeed, a considerable amount of
work has provided support for the view that technical trading rules are capable of
producing valuable economic signals in foreign exchange markets [see, Dooley and
Shafer (1983), Taylor (1992) and Levich and Thomas (1993), among others]. 
Private agents in financial markets use a variety of tools in order to capture the
trends of the series. Drawing from previous academic studies and the technical analysis
literature, in this paper we employ the simplest and most common trading rules (MA) as
the signal-extraction procedure used by market practitioners, since empirical evidence
suggests that they are able to create successful dynamic trading strategies. Alternatively,
this signal-extraction procedure can be thought of as the mechanism used by the central
banks in order to learn the perceptions of agents with respect to their commitment













where It is a credibility indicator and n1 (n2) denotes the number of observations
included in the short (long) window of the moving average signal. This procedure is
assumed to capture the instantaneous momentum in the credibility indicator by
comparing the average performance of the indicator over a short period with that over a
longer period. Therefore, based on this signal, for each indicator and currency we
construct a binary variable. Whenever the signal is positive, the credibility indicator
would increase and a value 1 is assigned to that signal. Conversely, when it is negative,
we would expect a reduction in the credibility indicator and a value 0 is assigned to that
date
14.
In order to mitigate the danger of "data snooping" biases, we do not search for
ex-post "successful" MA rules, but rather evaluate a wide set of rules that have been
known to practitioners for at least several decades. In particular, we evaluate the
following popular moving average rules: [1,4], [1,8], [1, 12], [1, 16] and [1,20], where
the first number in each pair indicates the days in the short period (n1) and the second
number shows the days in the long period (n2)
15.
                                               
13 For example, Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) report that over 90% of participants
in the London market rely on technical strategies when formulating short-term exchange-rate
expectations.
14 As can be seen, the moving average rule is essentially a trend following system because when prices
are rising (falling), the short-period average tends to have larger (lower) values than the long-period
average, signalling an increase (a reduction) in the credibility indicator.
15 These MA rules are roughly the weekly equivalent to the daily rules examined by LeBaron (1992) and
Levich and Thomas (1993) to show the statistical significance of the technical trading rules against
several parametric null models of exchange rates.12
For the indicators obtained from the models of discrete choice and marginal
credibility, a reduction indicates a loss of credibility, whereas an increase can be
interpreted as a credibility gain. Therefore, in this case we take a transition from a value
0 to a value 1 as a “realignment” (R) signal, while we interpret the change from 1 to 0 as
a “no realignment” (NR) signal. The opposite is true for the indicators derived from the
drift-adjustment method, since in this case an increase (decrease) in the indicator
suggests credibility losses (gains). It should be noticed that there is a connection
between our approach and the literature that models the exchange rates of the EMS as
switching between two distributions [one that holds in stable times and the other that
holds in volatile times [see Engel and Hakkio (1996)]. Indeed, the plots from the signals
derived from our approach are very similar to the smoothed probabilities of being in
different regimes implied by regime-switching models.
Following this procedure, and for each indicator and currency, we can classify
each week in the sample as being either R or NR and therefore we can compare this
classification with the realignments really observed. Table 5 reports the ratio of
successfully identified cases, expressed in percentage terms, when identifying a
particular week in the sample as R or NR.
[Tables 5, here]
As can be seen, the marginal credibility clearly outperforms the rest of indicators
regardless of the MA we consider for extracting signals, except for the IRL where the
DAM indicator yields the highest success ratio. These results suggest that the marginal
credibility should be our preferred indicator
16. The second best indicator is the
probability of realignment based on the distance of the exchange rate to central parity
(L4), except for the BFR where the DAM indicator is ranked in second place. These
results could indicate the relevance of maintaining the exchange rate near to central
parity in order to avoid system instability, as suggested by Bertola and Caballero
(1992). Finally, note also that the success ratio increases in all cases with the days in the
long period in the MA rule.
As a further comparison among indicators, we explore their behaviour in terms
of efficiency by the application of DEA methods. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
allows the use of linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric piecewise
surface over the indicators and the currencies.
The DEA method allows an efficient frontier to be achieved. We are interested
in obtaining the maximum outputs by minimising the quantity of inputs. We have to
solve this input-orientated linear programming problem
17:
                                               
16 We have also computed Fisher´s exact test that gives the probability of observing a table with as much
evidence of association as the table actually observed (under the null of no association). The results from
this test (not shown here but available from the authors upon request) also favour the marginal credibility
indicator, since in general it yields the probability that is closest to 0, suggesting that the classification of
R derived from this indicator is perfectly associated with the observed realignments
17 A comprehensive description of these methods can be found in Seiford and Thrall (1990). In this paper
we have used the DEAP 2.1.13
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where qi is the scalar that measures the degree of efficiency of each indicator, as
proposed by Farrell (1957). A value of 1 tells us that this indicator is on the frontier
(i.e., it is efficient, while a value less than 1 shows that is inefficient, where 1-q is the
percentage in which inputs could be reduced in order to reach efficiency). l is a Nx1
vector of parameters which allows us to obtain a fictitious and efficient credibility
indicator from the observations. X is a KxN input matrix, and Y is a MxN output matrix,
where K is the number of inputs, M is the number of outputs, and N is the number of
indicators. xi and yi represent the vector of inputs and the vector of outputs associated to
the i-th indicator, respectively. N1’ is an Nx1 vector of ones. The first restriction fixes
the output while the second one is an indication of the need to minimise the inputs used.
The third restriction permits a variable returns to scale approach.
In particular, we use an input-oriented DEA method in which we have five
inputs, each one being the average error associated with the use of each one of the five
MA rules that we have analysed. Following a simplification similar to Cooper et al.
(2000, p. 173), we can define an output with the value 1, since in our problem we have
only five inputs: the average errors from each MA rule. Therefore, we have 42 elements
generated by the six indicators and the seven currencies. The results are presented in
Table 6.
[Table 6, here]
As can be observed, in four out of the five cases considered, the highest values
of the efficiency parameter are those obtained for marginal credibility, the exception
being again the IRL. Moreover, for three currencies (BFR, DKR and ESC) the marginal
credibility indicator yields the maximum level of efficiency (i.e., a value of 1). These
results reinforce our previous conclusion that marginal credibility is the best indicator in
order to capture true signals of realignments and that it does not convey false signals.
As before, the probability of realignment based on the distance of the exchange rate to
central parity appears to be the second best indicator, since it returns satisfactory levels
of efficiency (although always under 0.5).
As shown in Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (1999a, 2000), daily data confirm the
relevance of marginal credibility, and also point to a further advantage with respect to
the rest of the credibility measures when the objective is to detect the main realignments
that occurred during the sample period. This fact could be related to the capability of the
marginal credibility indicator in capturing the volatility of the series. When using daily
data, the information is processed more efficiently, avoiding the smoothing of the
volatility curve when the frequency is reduced to the weekly level.14
4. ERM-II
With the beginning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the former EMS
ceased to have effect. It was replaced by the new ERM-II. Under this mechanism, the
four member states that did not introduce the euro for the time being were given the
chance to prepare themselves for full incorporation in the euro area. Denmark and
Greece took advantage of this option from 1
st January 1999, while Sweden and the
United Kingdom have stayed outside. Central and intervention rates are all defined in
terms of the euro. A fluctuation margin of ±2.25% was set for the DKR and a standard
margin of ±15% was agreed for the Greek dracma (GRD). Participation in the ERM-II
is in principle voluntary, but it is a prerequisite for introducing the euro at a later stage.
The objective of ERM-II has been to ensure exchange-rate stability between the
euro area and the EU members who have not introduced the single currency, adding
another element of stability to the process of European integration. The ERM-II is also
likely to be significant in the light of the enlargement of the EU to include a number of
countries in central and eastern Europe. Once these countries have joined the EU, they
will need  to adjust their currencies to the euro by participating in the ERM-II.
On 19 June 2000, the EU Council, having assessed that Greece fulfilled the
requirements of the Treaty, approved its accession to the euro area as a twelfth member
from 1 January 2001. On the same day, the Council also decided that the conversion
rate between the GRD and the euro should be equal to the dracma’s central rate in the
ERM-II. The convergence of the GRD towards its central rate was facilitated by a 3.5%
revaluation of its central rate on 17 January 2000. Given that on 28 September 2000 a
majority of the Danish electorate rejected the adoption of the euro, the Danish krone is
the only currency currently participating in the ERM-II.
In this section we examine the ERM-II covering a period from January 1
st 1999
to January 1
st 2001 for the GRD and from January 1
st 1999 to September 30
th 2002 for
the DKR. We study the credibility of both exchange rates vis-à-vis the Euro. The
estimates for the different indicators are shown in Tables 7a-7d.
[Tables 7a-7d., here]
As can be seen in Table 7a, the variables used in the estimation of the expected
rate of depreciation within the band (for the Drift-Adjustment Method) are significant
and the signs of the parameters are those expected, except for those associated with the
Danish interest rate. With respect to the devaluation probability, as can be seen in Table
7b, the estimated coefficients are all statistically significant. Again the estimated
(credibility) probabilities for the GRD have a mean that is greater than 0.88, suggesting
a subjective probability of realignment of 0.12. The Danish krone presents greater
fluctuation due to the instability on 28 September 2000, when the majority of Danish
voters rejected the adoption of the euro in a referendum. Lastly, the estimation of
marginal credibility (at) is based on equation (6), where the random disturbance ut is
normal with a zero mean and constant variance. Table 7d reports the estimation results.
The upper panel in that table shows OLS estimates of at as a benchmark for
comparisons.
Danish krone15
Danmarks Nationalbank chose to stabilise the DKR close to the central rate, as is
shown in Figure 7. In spite of this, the indicators point out unstability in the run-up and
the aftermath of the Danish rejection of the adoption of the euro on 28 September 2000.
Indeed, these pressures were countered by foreign exchange interventions and key
interest rate changes. The Drift-Adjustment Method, presented in Figure 7c, indicates a
small expected rate of depreciation in July and September of 2000. In fact, Denmark’s
Nationalbank intervened in the markets in September 2000, purchasing foreign
exchange to dampen an appreciation in the DKR.. The probability of realignment based
on the interest rate differential detects this event more clearly from June to October of
2000, as well as in January 2001.
The Danish status in the EMU seems to be due to non-economic reasons, since
the behaviour of its fundamentals would permit its accession to the euro as captured by
the credibility indicators.
Greek dracma
Greece chose a ±15% fluctuation band in its two-year history in the ERM-II. As
can be observed in Figure 8a, the GRD was perceived to enter the ERM-II with an
undervaluated central parity in order to avoid speculative attacks. In this sense, the
revaluation of January 2000 brought this exchange rate nearer to its central parity. In
spite of this, the Drift-Adjustment Method (Figure 8c) and the probability of
devaluation (Figure 8d) detect instability only around the realignment. The marginal
credibility shows a slow reduction in credibility that only stops after the realignment of
the GRD.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have provided some new evidence on the credibility of the
ERM. We differ from previous studies in the literature in four main respects. First, our
main contribution is the use of several credibility indicators, some of which have never
been applied before to all of the currencies under study. This allows us to strengthen the
results obtained in this paper. Second, we analyse a longer period than that of previous
studies, covering the complete EMS history. Third, we have carried out a comparison of
the prediction qualities of the different indicators, in order to explore their ability to
capture the main ERM events (realignments, changes in the fluctuations bands and
speculative pressures). Fourth, we apply the indicators to the experience of the ERM-II,
showing the relevance of this approach in the near future with the enlargement of the
EU.
The country-by-country analysis made in this paper shows: (i) before the
currency crisis in late 1992, for most of the countries, the exchange rate policy was
credible, except for the Italian case (a similar conclusion is derived in Weber, 1991a);
(ii) the 1992 currency turbulence was accompanied, in the first instance, by credibility
losses in all countries, except Belgium and the Netherlands. This is consistent with the
fact that the Dutch guilder and the Belgian franc, along with the Deutschmark, were the
only currencies that were not affected by speculative attacks during the fall of 1992; (iii)
after the widening of the fluctuation bands there was a gain in credibility for the16
currencies participating in the ERM, with the exception of the Belgian franc and the
Irish pound. This is consistent with, and tends to confirm, the claims by both Ayuso et
al. (1994) and Sosvilla-Rivero et al. (1999) that the broadening of the bands led to a
decrease in volatility to levels comparable to those prevailing before the crisis.
Our results are consistent with the evolution of the nature of the EMS (see, e. g.
De Grauwe, 2000). First, the relatively large fluctuation bands in the EMS (compared to
those in the Bretton Woods system), together with relatively small and frequent
realignments, helped to reduce the size of speculative capital movements and stabilised
the system during the 1980s. In the early 1990s, however, the evolution of the EMS into
a truly fixed exchange rate system with almost perfect capital mobility led to credibility
losses in a context of policy conflict among EMS countries about how to face the severe
recession experienced in 1992-93. Finally, after the crisis of 1993, the EMS changed its
nature in drastic ways. The EMS gained credibility with the enlargement of the
fluctuation bands to ±15% (reducing the scope for large speculative gains) and with the
fixed exchange rate commitment among potential EMU-member countries. As a result,
speculation became a stabilising factor and the market rates converged closer and closer
to the fixed conversion rates, although the world was hit by a major crisis during the
second half of 1998 (De Grauwe et al., 1999).
We have also compared indicators according to their ability to detect the main
events in the history of the ERM. The results suggest that marginal credibility is the best
indicator in order to capture true signals of realignments and not to convey false signals.
This could be due to the fact that this is an indicator that recognises the changing nature
of central parities, the width of the bands and the realignment expectations in the history
of the ERM. The probability of realignment based on the distance of the exchange rate
to central parity comes in the second place in our comparative exercise.
We consider that our results are of interest, not only for the European experience
in the 1979-1998 period, but also for the analysis of other possible target zones, such as
the new ERM (ERM II), linking the currencies of non-euro area Member States to the
euro, both current European Union Member States  and future candidates (see ECOFIN,
2000). The EMS experience suggests that such an exchange rate system can only work
within the framework of a temporary regime towards a full monetary union, since it is
too fragile as a permanent monetary regime. The 1979-1998 period has shown us that
the ERM-II could face similar problems to those experienced by the EMS during 1992-
1993 (i.e., that if the prospect for a quick entry of the "out" members are weak, there
could be speculative crises and a possible collapse of the arrangement). Therefore,
participation in the ERM-II and future euro adoption could serve as a powerful anchor
for economic, monetary and exchange rate policies in accession countries (guiding
policy-makers as well as market participants), whenever the achievements in the areas
of macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms would support the convergence
process within the EU. Indeed, the ERM-II must be judged in the light of the planned
EU enlargement once it is put to a test.17
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Figure 2: Maximum and Minimum Expected Rates of Realignment
Figure2a:BFR
.



























































Notes:  Blue line = minimum expected rate of realignment, based on Svensson’s simple
test.
Red line = maximum expected rate of realingnment, based on Svensson’s
simple test.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.21
Figure 3: Expected Rate of Realignment
Figure3e:HFL
.























































Notes:  Green line = expected realignment rate, based on estimation results in Table
2.
Red line = 90 per cent confidence interval’s upper limit.
Blue lien = 90 per cent confidence interval’s lower limit
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.22
Figure 4: Estimated Devaluation Probabilities
Figure4a:BFR
.





















































Notes:  Inverse of devaluation probabilities, based on estimation results in Table 3, column 5.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.23
Figure 5: Marginal Credibility
Figure5a:BFR
.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes:  Credibility indicator based on estimation results in Table 5.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.25
Figure 6.- Comparison among indicators
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Note: DAM=Drift-adjustment method, L1=crisis probability from the exchange rate, L2=crisis probability from central parity distance, L3= crisis probability from upper band
distance, L4=crisis probability from the interest rate differential, and MC=Marginal Credibility.25
Figure 7. Credibility indicators for the DKR in the ERM-II
Fig7a: DKR/EUR exchange rate
.






Fig7c:Expected Rate of Realigment
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Figure 7. Credibility indicators for the GRD in the ERM-II


























































































































































































































Table 1. Expected exchange rate depreciation within the band





















































































































Note: OLS estimation of equation (9). Newey-West standard errors within parentheses. Di (i=1,..,11) denote
dummy variables for subperiods delimited by the realignments of the exchange rate and the widening of the
bands.29
Table 2. Logit estimation results
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Note: Estimation of equation (10). Standard errors within parentheses.30
Table 3. Summary statistics of the estimated probability

































































































































































































































































Note: Estimation of equation (10). Standard errors within parentheses.31
Table 4. Kalman filter estimates of marginal credibility




























































































Note: Estimation by maximum likelihood (ML). Standard errors within parentheses.
1: From March 1979 to September 1992. 
2: From November 1996 to December 199825
Table 5a. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: BFR
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 68.35 67.96 66.99 68.06 69.42 93.01
(1,8) 78.46 67.93 66.96 68.03 69.59 92.98
(1,12) 84.44 82.78 80.04 82.49 83.76 96.87
(1,16) 85.07 86.05 82.22 85.76 87.62 97.35
(1,20) 87.97 87.48 83.83 86.98 87.48 97.53
Average 80.86 78.44 76.01 78.26 79.57 95.55
Table 5b. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: DKR
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 71.26 68.16 67.09 67.86 74.26 93.88
(1,8) 80.90 80.31 78.56 80.06 83.82 96.39
(1,12) 82.88 84.15 81.90 82.97 86.20 96.97
(1,16) 85.17 85.76 82.22 86.35 88.8 97.15
(1,20) 87.18 89.25 84.71 88.36 90.63 97.73
Average 81.48 81.53 78.90 81.12 84.74 96.42
Table 5c. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: ESC
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 70.21 69.32 70.80 71.39 76.99 94.10
(1,8) 83.28 80.90 82.39 82.99 86.27 96.69
(1,12) 87.01 88.22 87.61 88.22 90.63 97.43
(1,16) 89.91 89.3 88.99 91.13 91.44 98.00
(1,20) 92.26 90.09 90.71 91.95 92.57 98.47
Average 84.53 83.57 84.10 85.14 87.58 96.9436
Table 5d. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: FF
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 73.50 71.65 71.26 71.84 72.43 78.74
(1,8) 82.26 83.14 81.09 83.53 81.77 84.41
(1,12) 84.83 86.01 82.78 85.81 86.79 88.36
(1,16) 86.25 87.72 84.09 88.11 88.51 89.88
(1,20) 88.17 88.46 85.31 88.86 88.76 90.04
Average 83.00 83.40 80.91 83.63 83.65 86.29
Table 5e. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: HFL
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 70.04 67.90 65.86 69.07 70.43 74.12
(1,8) 79.04 78.46 74.95 78.27 80.9 82.26
(1,12) 81.70 80.53 78.08 80.92 82.78 85.23
(1,16) 84.77 83.01 80.16 84.58 85.27 87.52
(1,20) 86.79 85.70 84.02 86.29 86.98 89.15
Average 80.47 79.12 76.61 79.83 81.27 83.66
Table 5f. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: IRL
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 73.59 70.68 69.22 70.97 70.87 71.65
(1,8) 83.04 78.95 78.17 78.65 82.46 82.07
(1,12) 87.08 83.95 81.41 84.64 84.64 85.23
(1,16) 89.88 87.23 85.07 87.92 89.78 86.15
(1,20) 90.24 87.97 85.6 88.86 91.03 89.15
Average 84.77 81.76 79.89 82.21 83.76 82.8536
Table 5g. Percentage of success when identifying realignments and no realignments: PTA
MA DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
(1,4) 69.03 72.47 71.26 73.68 71.46 84.01
(1,8) 81.22 80.00 80.20 82.04 83.27 89.80
(1,12) 88.89 85.6 85.39 87.24 87.45 91.36
(1,16) 89.00 86.93 85.89 88.59 89.21 94.19
(1,20) 89.33 87.24 87.03 88.49 90.38 93.31
Average 83.49 82.45 81.95 84.01 84.35 90.53
Note: DAM=Drift Adjustment Method, L1=crisis probability from the exchange rate, L2=crisis
probability from central parity distance, L3= crisis probability from upper band distance, L4=crisis
probability from the interest rate differential, and MC=Marginal Credibility
Table 6: Relative efficiency. DEA analysis.
DAM L1 L2 L3 L4 MC
BFR 0.224 0.243 0.206 0.228 0.273 1
DKR 0.226 0.254 0.202 0.234 0.3 1
ESC 0.34 0.288 0.321 0.444 0.385 1
FF 0.246 0.273 0.232 0.316 0.295 0.327
HFL 0.228 0.21 0.198 0.231 0.237 0.277
IRL 0.353 0.261 0.228 0.305 0.333 0.237
PTA 0.291 0.25 0.291 0.341 0.304 0.501
Note: DAM=Drift Adjustment Method, L1=crisis probability from the exchange rate, L2=crisis
probability from central parity distance, L3= crisis probability from upper band distance, L4=crisis
probability from the interest rate differential, and MC=Marginal Credibility36




















Note: OLS estimation of equation (9). Newey-West standard errors within parentheses. D1 denote
dummy variables for subperiods delimited by the realignments of the exchange rate.











































Note: Estimation of equation (10). Standard errors within parentheses.36



























































































Note: Estimation of equation (10). Standard errors within parentheses.




























Note: Estimation by maximum likelihood (ML). Standard errors within parentheses.